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ABSTRACT
Saying that x is ineﬀable seems to be paradoxical – either I cannot
say anything about x, not even that it is ineﬀable – or I can say
that it is ineﬀable, but then I can say something and it is not
ineﬀable. In this article, I discuss Alston’s version of the paradox
and a solution proposed by Hick which employs the concept of
formal and substantial predicates. I reject Hick’s proposal and
develop a diﬀerent account based on some passages from
Pseudo-Dionysius’ Mystica Theologia. ‘God is ineﬀable’ is a meta-
linguistic statement concerning propositions about God: not all
propositions about God are expressible in a human language.
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Mystics and mystically minded philosophers have often claimed that God, the Godhead,
nirvana, the Dao or some other object of mystical experience is ineﬀable, that it cannot be
described or put into words. This claim is so deeply connected to virtually all kinds of
mysticism thatWilliam James declared ineﬀability to be the ﬁrst of four essential properties
of mystical experience.1 But there is a severe problem about the statement that God or any
other object of mystical experience is ineﬀable: how can I meaningfully say about some-
thing that it is ineﬀable? For if it were ineﬀable, I could not say anything about it, not even
that it is ineﬀable. And vice versa, if I can say about it that it is ineﬀable, there is at least one
thing I can say about it – namely, that it is ineﬀable – and then it cannot be ineﬀable. It
seems as if any proposition of the form ‘X is ineﬀable’ (I shall call this the ineﬀability thesis)
is paradoxical or self-defeating. But if nothing can meaningfully be said to be ineﬀable, then
the ineﬀable would not be very interesting – because nothing can be said about it. And even
worse: All mystical claims about God’s ineﬀability, all theories of God’s nature and of
mystical experience based on this claim will become pointless, since anything follows from
a contradictory statement. So, if mysticism is supposed to have any philosophical meaning,
we ought to ﬁnd a way to resolve this paradox. Is it possible to say that something is
ineﬀable without contradicting oneself? Or is any such utterance self-defeating and analy-
tically false, simply because of the meaning of the term ineﬀable?2
1. Alston: ineﬀability
Some of the most important objections to the ineﬀability thesis can be found in William
Alston’s classic paper Ineﬀability.3 Alston begins with a deﬁnition of ineﬀability: ‘To say
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that God is ineﬀable is to say that no concepts apply to Him, and that He is without
qualities. […] And this implies that any statement of the form “God is x” is false’.4 So,
claiming that God is ineﬀable means two things: First, that no predicates apply to God
(which is the basic meaning), and second, that all statements, in which something is
predicated of God, are false (which is the consequence). From this deﬁnition, Alston
derives two arguments against the ineﬀability thesis.
His ﬁrst argument is actually more of an explanation of the paradox of ineﬀability
based on his deﬁnition of the term. If we say that God is ineﬀable, then we predicate
something of God (since we apply the predicate ‘ineﬀable’ to him), which is impossible
according to the deﬁnition of ineﬀability. More precisely, we could put the argument
like this:
(1) If an object o is ineﬀable, then no predicate F can be applied to o.
(2) In the statement ‘o is ineﬀable’ a predicate is applied to o.
(3) Therefore, o is not ineﬀable.
Alston’s second argument is a little more subtle.5 Let us assume it were possible to
consistently say that something is ineﬀable. Then, Alston claims, we are still not saying
that some unknown X is ineﬀable, but rather that some conceptually describable thing
is, namely God. And since we are using a speciﬁc proper name for the ineﬀable object,
we should be able to justify our use of this name by identifying the object in question.
Otherwise, there would be no reason to call the object ‘God’. Now, identifying some-
thing as God is possible by ascribing certain properties to the object in question, which
diﬀerentiate God from other objects, like being perfectly good or incorporeal or
omniscient. Alston is obviously following Frege’s principle ‘sense determines reference’
here: the properties we use to identify God are the sense of the term ‘God’ and this
sense determines its reference and correct usage. But if God is ineﬀable and it is,
therefore, impossible to predicate something of him, we cannot identify him, either,
because the name cannot have a sense which determines its reference. And if we cannot
identify him, we cannot even understand the name ‘God’. But we do understand and
use this name (and the mystic will probably not want to deny that), so God cannot be
ineﬀable.
(4) A speaker s uses a proper name n for an object o correctly iﬀ s is able to name at
least one property F of o, which identiﬁes o as reference o of n.
(5) If s can name F, s can predicate F of o.
(6) Therefore: s is using n correctly, iﬀ s can predicate F of o.
(7) Therefore: If s is using n correctly, o cannot be ineﬀable.
These two arguments are Alston’s reasons for rejecting the ineﬀability thesis. In
addition, he derives two minimal conditions from them, which any adequate inter-
pretation of the ineﬀability thesis must fulﬁl: (1) the sentence interpreting the thesis
must not itself be a member of the class of sentences which the thesis declares to be
ineﬀable, and (2) a speaker must still be able to identify the object which is said to be
ineﬀable.6
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2. Hick: formal and substantial predicates
The most notable reply to Alston’s arguments comes from John Hick. As a part of his
pluralist hypothesis, Hick maintains that the Real, which shows itself in religious or
mystic experiences across cultures, is ineﬀable and can only be grasped in categories
shaped by our respective cultures and traditions. So, if a Christian mystic experiences a
personal God while Buddhists experience the non-personal state of nirvana, there is no
actual contradiction, since the contradictory predicates only apply to the various
personae of the Real, not to the Real itself. The Real itself is beyond the categories of
human thought and is, therefore, ineﬀable; our predicates do not apply to it. Hick,
being aware of the problems this claim implies, tries to avoid the paradox of ineﬀability
by making a distinction between formal and substantial predicates.7 Formal predicates
tell us nothing about what the Real is like in itself, substantial predicates do. If, e.g. I say
about the Real that it is a possible object of reference, then this is just a formal
predicate, while saying that it is a person is a substantial predicate. So, with regard to
Alston’s argument, Hick seems to reject premise (1): It is not the case that no predicates
can be applied to an ineﬀable object – formal predicates can be applied and (this is a
relevant additional premise, which strangely enough Hick never mentions explicitly)
ineﬀability is a formal predicate. So, Alston’s ﬁrst condition, an interpretation of
ineﬀability which does not run into a self-referential paradox, seems to be fulﬁlled.8
But unfortunately there are several reasons why Hick’s approach cannot solve the
paradox of ineﬀability.
(a) Formal predicates are still predicates. If by ‘ineﬀable’ we mean that no predicates
apply to the object in question, then no formal predicates apply to it, either. Given this
deﬁnition, the statement ‘God is ineﬀable’ remains paradoxical even if we accept the
distinction between formal and substantial predicates. But maybe this is not what Hick
means. Perhaps we should assume that he is including his distinction in the deﬁnition
of ineﬀability, so that Alston’s premise (1) should actually read:
(1) If an object o is ineﬀable, then no substantial predicate F can be applied to o.
In this case, granted that ‘ineﬀable’ is not a substantial predicate, the paradox disap-
pears. But this solution requires us to signiﬁcantly alter the original deﬁnition of
ineﬀability without giving us any reason to do so (other than that it solves the paradox).
Now, of course we may deﬁne ineﬀability in a way that avoids any self-referential
contradictions, e.g. by saying that something is ineﬀable iﬀ nothing can be said about it
except that it is ineﬀable. But this deﬁnition in no way explains why ‘ineﬀable’ should
be an exception, just like Hick’s (alleged) deﬁnition oﬀers no explanation for the
exclusion of formal predicates. We should not accept a diﬀerent deﬁnition unless
there are convincing reasons to do so. Moreover, even if we accept the altered deﬁnition
there are still two questionable assumptions on which it rests: ﬁrst, that there is a
criterion for clearly distinguishing between formal and substantial predicates,
and second, that ‘ineﬀable’ is itself a formal predicate. These assumptions provide
further reasons to reject Hick’s argument.
(b) The distinction between formal and substantial predicates is far from clear. It
seems as if Hick takes formal predicates to be purely metalinguistic, i.e. describing the
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use of the term ‘the Real’ in our language.9 But the use of a term is already shaped by
certain substantial presuppositions. If I say, e.g. that ‘the Real’ can be used as the subject
in a sentence, then this should be a formal predicate according to Hick. But at the same
time, it tells us something about the nature of the Real, namely that we should think of
it as some kind of object or entity (in the broadest sense of the word), in contrast to,
say, a property. There are other cases in which it is not clear how to decide whether
some predicate is formal or substantial. What, e.g. is the status of ‘real’? Depending on
how we understand this term it could either be a metalinguistic predicate explaining the
concept of truth a speaker employs in his utterances about reality, or it could be a
substantial predicate which diﬀerentiates something as part of the real world from mere
ﬁctions. So, what makes a predicate formal or substantial at least sometimes depends on
the context or the speaker’s intentions. But then, it is not the predicates themselves that
are formal or substantial.
(c) Furthermore, even if we accepted the distinction between these two types of
predicates in principle, it seems plausible that no predicate at all could be a formal
predicate in Hick’s sense. For what is it supposed to mean that formal predicates do not
tell us ‘what the Godhead in itself is like’?10 That they do not say anything at all?
Obviously not, since a predicate that says nothing about the thing of which it is
supposed to predicate something, neither explicitly nor implicitly, simply is not a
predicate, it is just noise. But maybe Hick is thinking about predicates which tell us
nothing about the nature or essence of the Real? But then, which predicates do tell us
something about nature or essence of the Real? Presumably those which apply to it
necessarily but not to all objects.11 So, formal predicates would be those which apply to
all objects. Now, maybe there actually are such predicates, although only a few (there is
surprisingly little which can be said about all objects of predication, real or ﬁctional –
‘possible’ seems to be a legitimate candidate). But even if there are formal predicates in
this sense, what is their point? They obviously cannot tell us anything actually inter-
esting about the thing of which they are predicated, since all they say applies to literally
everything else.
(d) This leads to the ﬁnal objection: even if there are formal predicates, ‘ineﬀable’
surely is not a member of this class, since the Real is supposed to be diﬀerent from
other entities precisely by being ineﬀable.12 Maybe Hick thinks that ‘ineﬀable’ is a
metalinguistic predicate that describes our use of language regarding the Real, no
matter what else it might apply to. After all, it merely means that no predicates apply
to the Real. But if I say that the Real is ineﬀable, I am not just describing my use of
the term ‘the Real’. Rather, I am implicitly conveying a certain idea of the Real which
is my reason for taking it to be ineﬀable. Using the term ‘ineﬀable’ again implies
substantial assumptions about the Real: it is conceived of as having certain properties
which justify the use of ‘ineﬀable’. But then, ‘ineﬀable’ is a substantial predicate (at
least indirectly).
So, it seems as though Hick’s solution fails: there is no meaningful distinction
between formal and substantial predicates, and even if there were, we would not have
any reason to think that ‘ineﬀable’ (or anything) is a formal predicate, and even if it
were, this would not solve the paradox of ineﬀability. We need an alternative solution.
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3. A Dionysian approach
In what follows, I will try to provide a better solution by outlining an argument which
shows that even if Alston’s two conditions are met, the ineﬀability thesis can still be
true. The critical step here is shifting the focus from Alston’s ﬁrst premise to the second.
The problem is not the deﬁnition of ineﬀability, but the interpretation of the statement
‘X is ineﬀable’ itself.13 Alston assumes that the statement ‘God is ineﬀable’ is a
predication, in which the predicate ‘ineﬀable’ is applied to the object ‘God’. But this
assumption, from which the whole paradox results, is false. I will now sketch an
alternative interpretation of the ineﬀability thesis (on the basis of some remarks in
Pseudo-Dionysius’ Mystica Theologia) which does not end up in a paradox.
Now, the Mystica Theologia is a rather short and rather obscure text and does not
appear particularly suited to be the foundation of an argument in philosophy of
language.14 But Pseudo-Dionysius, like many other mystics, believes that God is
ineﬀable and the way in which he explicates the notion of ineﬀability stands in stark
contrast to Alston’s interpretation. He writes:
It [the Godhead] is not number or order, greatness or smallness, equality or inequality,
similarity or dissimilarity […]. It falls neither within the predicate of nonbeing nor of
being.15
Here, Pseudo-Dionysius consistently negates all predicates which could in any way
apply to the Godhead, positive or negative. It has been argued that this retreat into
negativity is pointless,16 since a negative predicate is still a predicate. If we say that God
is neither existent nor non-existent, we are applying to him the complex negative
predicate ‘neither-existent-nor-non-existent’. But this is a predicate, too, and we must
again negate it by saying that it is not the case that God is neither existent nor non-
existent, which results in an inﬁnite regress of ever more complex predicates. Moreover,
since Frege the distinction between positive and negative predicates is considered
spurious: ‘heavy’ appears to be a positive predicate, ‘not light’ a negative one, although
semantically there is no diﬀerence in meaning between the two. But this criticism
misunderstands the intention behind Pseudo-Dionysius’ negations. He explicitly says
that these are not to be understood as negative predications in the standard sense:
Now we should not conclude that the negations are simply the opposites of the aﬃrma-
tions, but rather that the cause of all is considerably prior to this, beyond privations,
beyond every denial, beyond every assertion.17
So, for Pseudo-Dionysius, the function of the negative predicates is not to deny certain
properties of the Godhead. It is rather something wholly diﬀerent, since the Godhead is
ontologically distinct from all entities to which positive and negative predicates can be
meaningfully applied.18 Further in the following, he says clearly:
It is beyond assertion and denial. We make assertions and denials of what is next to it, but
never of it, for it is both beyond every assertion, being the perfect and unique cause of all
things, and, by virtue of its pre-eminently simple and absolute nature, free of every
limitation, beyond every limitation; it is also beyond every denial.19
This directly contradicts Alston’s claim that ‘God is ineﬀable’ is a kind of predication.
For if it is impossible to predicate anything of God, then this statement cannot be a
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predication either, even if its grammatical form suggests otherwise. The double nega-
tives do not aim to apply a complex negative predicate, but rather are an attempt to
make us give up the whole process of predication with regard to God.
Consequently, we should drop the phrase ‘God is ineﬀable’ altogether, since it
suggests that there is a certain property of God – namely, his ineﬀability – which is
designated by the term ‘ineﬀable’. But if we follow Pseudo-Dionysius, this reading
is false, because it presupposes that something is predicated of God, which he considers
impossible. But then, what does it mean to say that God is ineﬀable? My suggestion
is this: ineﬀability is not predicated of God, but rather of propositions about God. God is
not ineﬀable, propositions about God are. That is, the term ‘ineﬀable’ can only be
meaningfully applied to things which could in principle be expressible – namely,
propositions. ‘Ineﬀable’ is indeed a metalinguistic predicate (as Hick suspected). But
contrary to Hick, it does not mean that no predicates apply to a certain object, but
rather that some propositions about this object do not fall into the class of propositions
we can express.
What is this supposed to mean? As argued above, Alston understands ineﬀability as
implying that no concepts apply to God. Following him, we could understand this in
two diﬀerent ways: either all propositions about God are said to be false, or they are said
to be meaningless. So, in a ﬁrst attempt we could interpret the statement ‘God is
ineﬀable’ as:
(I1) All propositions containing the term ‘God’ are meaningless.
This is clearly absurd. The whole concept of propositions about God being mean-
ingless is incomprehensible. What would a meaningless proposition be? Supposedly, a
proposition which does not represent any state of aﬀairs – but that is simply not a
proposition at all, it is just nonsense. A meaningless proposition is an oxymoron. And
even if we were more modest and just spoke of utterances instead of propositions, there
is prima facie no reason why utterances containing the term ‘God’ should be mean-
ingless. Using the term ‘God’ does not clash with any syntactical or semantical rules of
language, so what should deprive these utterances of their meaning? Why should
‘Christians believe that God created heaven and earth’ be meaningless? The only
plausible explanation that comes to mind is that God is ineﬀable – and this, of course,
begs the question. Maybe we should try the second option and replace ‘meaningless’
with ‘false’?
(I2) All propositions containing the term ‘God’ are false.
Now we got rid of the confusing concept of meaningless propositions, but another
problem remains: the thesis itself is paradoxical. The statement that all propositions
containing the term ‘God’ are false itself expresses a proposition, which contains the
term ‘God’ and so would say of itself that it is false. The paradox returns. At this point,
we might be tempted to soften our concept of truth and diﬀerentiate, as Jonathan
Jacobs suggests, between fundamental and non-fundamental truths.20 While a funda-
mental truth reﬂects the true structure of reality (it ‘carves nature at the joints’), a non-
fundamental truth does not without thereby being false. So it is not the case that all
propositions containing the term ‘God’ are false; they are merely not fundamentally
true.21 But this only shifts the problem: Are there any fundamentally true propositions
about God? If not, how is this any diﬀerent from atheism?22 If yes, what about those
propositions? Are they ineﬀable or not? If they are not, then we clearly cannot say that
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God is ineﬀable. But if they are, what does it mean to say they are ineﬀable if not that
they are not fundamentally true? We would still need a deﬁnition of ineﬀability.
Therefore, I suggest we keep our concept of truth unaltered and rather counter this
objection by reducing the scope of the thesis from a universal to a particular
generalization:
(I3) Some propositions containing the term ‘God’ are false.
If only some propositions which contain the term ‘God’ are false (or ineﬀable), then
it is possible that the thesis itself is not a part of the class of false (or ineﬀable)
propositions, and the paradox cannot arise. Claiming that all propositions containing
the term ‘God’ are false would be odd anyway, since utterances like ‘She believes in
God’ or ‘God is an object of religious worship’ are clearly meaningful and can be true.
But (I3) still cannot be right, either. If a proposition is false, its negation must (accord-
ing to the law of excluded middle) be true. So, if p is an ineﬀable proposition about God
and false, then non-p must be true: non-p is not false and therefore not ineﬀable. But if
non-p is eﬀable, why not p? This interpretation renders the whole ineﬀability thesis
pointless through a mere technicality. Besides, (I3) is completely trivial: Of course there
are some propositions which contain the term ‘God’ and are false (like: ‘God is a
bicycle’) – who would deny that?
The only solution is to accept that the propositions in question are neither mean-
ingless nor false, but simply ineﬀable. The term ‘ineﬀable’ cannot be substituted by
other expressions, and ineﬀability implies neither falsehood nor absurdity. So, by ‘God
is ineﬀable’ we mean:
(I4) Some propositions containing the term ‘God’ are ineﬀable.
An ineﬀable proposition is a proposition which cannot be expressed by any
sentence of a particular language. There are two ways to understand this statement:
(1) the proposition is ineﬀable because the language in question does not happen to
contain the terms necessary to express it. This still leaves open the possibility that
other languages might be able to express the proposition. Understood this way,
ineﬀability is a relative property: something can only be said to be ineﬀable in some
language. For example the proposition that your computer has just crashed is eﬀable
in modern English, but not in ancient Greek. We might call a proposition which is
ineﬀable in this sense inexpressible. (2) The proposition is ineﬀable because the
speaker lacks the concepts necessary to even grasp the proposition, let alone express
it. If this lack of concepts is not the result of insuﬃcient knowledge, but of conceptual
boundaries of the speaker’s cognitive structure, then this proposition will never be
expressible for a being with similar cognitive capacities. And if the being is human,
there cannot be any human language in which this proposition could be expressed. I
will call propositions which are ineﬀable in this sense incommunicable. So, while
inexpressible propositions are ineﬀable due to certain properties of a language (the
terms available), incommunicable propositions are ineﬀable due to properties of the
mind of speakers (the concepts available). Therefore, inexpressible propositions are
contingently ineﬀable (they are ineﬀable in some language), while incommunicable
propositions are necessarily so (they are ineﬀable in all (human) languages). If a
proposition is incommunicable, the speakers in question lack some or all of the
concepts required to grasp the proposition. A person who has no knowledge of
computers cannot grasp the concept of a computer and therefore cannot express
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any thoughts about computers. Of course, sometimes it will be possible to teach a
speaker the relevant concept, so that the once ineﬀable propositions become eﬀable (if
this is the case, the proposition was not incommunicable in the ﬁrst place, but merely
inexpressible). But this is not necessarily true in all cases. It is only possible for a
subject to learn a concept if the relevant object or property lies within its cognitive
capacities. Two-dimensional beings, like the inhabitants of Edwin Abbotts Flatland,
could never acquire the concept of space. But conceptualization is a necessary con-
dition for linguistic expression: the content of a linguistic expression is a proposition,
and propositions are deﬁned as conceptual.23 So, if a subject has certain mental
contents (e.g. experiences) which cannot be conceptualized, then these contents
cannot be expressed linguistically. And if there are areas of reality which are not
accessible to human conceptual thought due to our essential epistemic boundedness,24
propositions about these areas will be ineﬀable. In the case of mysticism, we would
know that the proposition has to be about God, since this follows from the boundary
conditions of mystical experience, but the proposition itself contains elements which
we cannot grasp cognitively. God’s ineﬀability would then result in there being facts
about God which cannot be expressed in any (human) language, since our conceptual
resources are not suﬃcient to express them. Our inability to express these facts does
not stem from deﬁciencies of our language, but rather from deﬁciencies of our mind.
Understood this way, the ineﬀability thesis can fulﬁl Alston’s two conditions without
becoming self-defeating. The ﬁrst condition states that the thesis itself must not be part
of the class of propositions to which it refers. This is clearly the case, since the thesis
only claims that some propositions containing the term ‘God’ are ineﬀable, not that all
of them are. Therefore, the thesis itself may well be one of the others.
The second condition demands that a speaker using the term ‘God’ must still be able
to identify the referent of this term, even if it is ineﬀable.25 This condition, too, can be
met, if we accept that there are at least some expressible propositions about God (and
why should there not be?) and that these propositions contain enough information to
identify some being as God. Among these identifying propositions could be that God is
the object of mystical experience, that he is perfectly good, or holy, or that the
experience of his presence will move us deeper than anything else. It could also be
something as simple as: that God is what I just experienced and that my master told me
it was God. These propositions may suﬃce to identify something as God (depending on
how high our standards for identiﬁcation are), even assuming that not every proposi-
tion which contains the term ‘God’ is expressible.
4. Two objections
(a) This interpretation is not faithful to the mystic’s intentions – Mystics usually say
that nothing can be said about God, not just that some things cannot be said.
This objection assumes that it is a core tenet of mystical philosophy that nothing can be
said about God, since he transcends our cognitive and linguistic capacities. If this really
is what the mystic is saying, then yes, my account will not be compatible with this
position. But it is not plausible to assume that radical ineﬀability of all propositions
about God is what the mystic has in mind. If God really were absolutely ineﬀable in this
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way, the mystic should never utter even a single word about him, but rather remain
completely silent. Mystics, as Gellman remarks laconically, have never been good at
this.26 Admittedly, mystics do occasionally say that nothing can be said about God, but
their actions suggest otherwise. The claim that nothing can be said about God is usually
found embedded in elaborate discussions of this very God.27 And if in doubt, we should
pay more attention to what the mystics actually say than to what they want us to hear.
And rightly so: not only will the assumption of absolute ineﬀability lead us directly into
the paradox; there is also simply no reason to believe that something is either com-
pletely ineﬀable or not ineﬀable at all. There is nothing wrong with assuming that some
propositions containing the term ‘God’ are expressible for us, while other propositions
from the same class are not (because they are about aspects of divine nature which are
not cognitively accessible to us).
The real diﬃculty lies in demarcating the boundary between eﬀable and ineﬀable
propositions, and this might well be a mystico-empirical question. So, even under this
modest interpretation, the ineﬀability thesis remains interesting, because it implies that
there are still some aspects of divine nature which lie beyond the boundaries of
language (with all metaphysical and epistemological implications). Our interest in
these aspects should not depend on their quantity.
(b) What exactly do you mean by ‘proposition’ in (I4)? Propositions are the contents
of sentences – how could there be an ineﬀable proposition?
Propositions are usually identiﬁed by a that-clause following a verb which describes
some kind of mental state like believing, thinking, experiencing, etc. This seems to
imply that propositions are linguistic entities, insofar as they are contents of expres-
sible statements. I would not deny that. Propositions are abstract objects representing
a state of aﬀairs, and by representing I mean that it is possible that there is a conscious
being which mentally represents them. So, for every proposition p it is possible that
there is some being s which is able to have a mental content that p. But this being
must not necessarily be human. Propositions are the contents of sentences, but not all
possible sentences (and all possible representations of states of aﬀairs) are expressible
in a human language. Why? Because propositions are structured; they are composed
of elementary mental representations, or concepts.28 If our human ability to form
concepts is limited, then it is conceivable that we may have non-conceptual experi-
ences, i.e. experiences of some state of aﬀairs which we cannot conceptualize. But if
we lack the relevant concepts to grasp the proposition, we cannot form a sentence to
express it – and the result will be an ineﬀable proposition. So, ineﬀable propositions
should be understood somewhat counterfactually: a proposition p is ineﬀable for
some subject s1 iﬀ it cannot be expressed in s1’s language and it is possible that
there is another subject s2 in whose language it is expressible. So yes, all propositions
must be expressible – just not by us. This suggests the possibility that there could be
other beings with greater cognitive capacities than we who are able to express in their
language propositions which are ineﬀable to us. Ultimately, all propositions are
expressible in the language of a cognitively unlimited being – nothing is ineﬀable in
the language of God.29
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY 9
Notes
1. James, Varieties, 380.
2. There is, of course, the option of avoiding the whole problem by not taking the term
‘ineﬀable’ at face value (e.g. Gale, ‘Mysticism and Philosophy’, 474). Calling an experience
ineﬀable would then merely be an expression of its great value and signiﬁcance for the
mystic, not a claim that something is literally ineﬀable. But dismissing some prima facie
substantial statement as merely metaphorical or expressive is always the easy way out. We
should not take it unless all other options to make sense of the statement fail.
3. A very similar argument can be found in Plantinga, Does God, 20ﬀ.
4. Alston, “Ineﬀability,” 507.
5. Ibid., 511ﬀ.
6. See note 4 above.
7. Hick, “Ineﬀability”; Hick, An Interpretation, xxﬀ.
8. Hick does not explicitly try to fulﬁl Alston’s second condition, but it could be argued that
the term ‘the Real’ is chosen speciﬁcally for being identiﬁable only by formal predicates.
The highly technical, artiﬁcial term ‘the Real’ does not seem to convey any hidden
substantial qualiﬁcations like the term ‘God’.
9. As his example ‘can be referred to’ suggests (Hick, “Ineﬀability,” 41).
10. Hick, “Ineﬀability,” 41.
11. For example, ‘human being’ is a predicate which tells us something about the nature of
Socrates, because it is necessary that Socrates is a human being. It could not be true that
Socrates is not a human being. But there are other objects which are not human beings. In
contrast, ‘possible object of reference’ applies necessarily to all things and therefore is not
a substantial predicate. cf. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 47.
12. A similar point is made by Kukla, Ineﬀability and Philosophy, 9.
13. That does not mean that premise (1) is true; I still believe that Alston’s deﬁnition is
ﬂawed. The reasons will become clear shortly.
14. What follows is not intended as a fair and faithful interpretation of Pseudo-Dionysius, but
rather as an argument inspired by his writings. I doubt if Pseudo-Dionysius himself would
have endorsed it.
15. de Mystica Theologia, 1048AB.
16. For this and the following argument see Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, 288ﬀ.
17. de Mystica Theologia, 1000B.
18. For Pseudo-Dionysius, God’s ineﬀability is a result of his being ontologically diﬀerent from us.
And while I agree with him that ontological diﬀerences imply ineﬀability, I do not think the
reverse is true: not everything which is ineﬀable must also be ontologically diﬀerent from us.
Ineﬀability may be quite mundane: for the colour-blind person, who lacks all concepts of
colours, colours are ineﬀable (or rather, propositions containing colour-concepts are inef-
fable). But that does not mean that colours belong to another ontological plane. Ineﬀability is
primarily an epistemic matter, not an ontological one.
19. de Mystica Theologia, 1048B.
20. Jacobs, “The Ineﬀable.”
21. Jacobs deﬁnes God’s ineﬀability as: ‘Every true proposition about how God is intrinsically
is non fundamental’. (Jacobs, “The Ineﬀable,” 165)
22. Jacobs, ‘The Ineﬀable’, 168f. actually addresses this criticism. He argues that the apophatic
theist can, unlike the atheist, ‘say that for any true proposition about God, it is true
because of God’. But if God is the ultimate truthmaker for all propositions about God,
then he is part of the ontological inventory of the universe. And then, at least one
proposition about God is fundamentally true: there is a God. So, if apophaticism is
supposed to be distinguishable from atheism, there will be at least one fundamentally
true proposition about God.
23. cf. e.g. Byrne, “Perception,” 234. – This holds only for assertoric utterances, of course.
24. This concept is borrowed from Fodor, The Modularity of Mind, 120.
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25. It is tempting to reject this condition by pointing out that it rests on a questionable view
on proper names. Alstons seems to presuppose a description theory of reference without
further justiﬁcation. But if we follow Kripke’s causal theory of reference and take proper
names as rigid designators, then there is no reason to assume that we must be able to
describe God and predicate something of him if we want to identify him as an object of
our experience. But then again the mystic has to be able to say something about God if he
identiﬁes him as being what is given in his mystical experience – namely, that he is what is
given in his mystical experience. A causal theory of reference does not require a speaker to
be able to describe the object she is referring to, but it implies that as soon as she starts to
use the term correctly, she has to be able to give at least a minimal description. So,
Alston’s second condition still stands: a minimal description of that which is said to be
ineﬀable must at the very least be possible.
26. Gellman, “Mysticism,” 3.1.
27. It is noteworthy that a lot of what mystics have to say about God is expressed in metaphors
and analogies. For example Eckhart speaks of the ‘desert of the Godhead’, and Ruysbroek
calls God ‘the dark silence in which all lovers lose themselves’ (quoted from Stace, Mysticism
and Philosophy, 97f.) This is not a mere coincidence: ineﬀability and metaphor go hand in
hand, and for a good reason. If we accept (1) that metaphors have cognitive content (i.e. they
can be true or false and are not just a way of expressing one’s feelings) and (2) that they are
irreducible (i.e. the meaning of a metaphor can never be completely reduced to the meaning
of a literal statement), then metaphors can express meanings which would otherwise be
inexpressible: they widen the boundaries of our language. We should think of metaphors as
quasi-concepts introduced to get a grasp on the things we can perceive, but not express
linguistically. So, metaphorical language bridges the gap between our limited conceptual
abilities and the vast parts of reality beyond it. Of course, this implies a lot of questions: Why
should we believe that metaphors are cognitive, irreducible, or untranslatable? What is a
quasi-concept and how does it diﬀer from ordinary concepts? How exactly can metaphors
bridge the gap between our language and the ineﬀable? Answering these questions is far
beyond the scope of the present essay, and I shall conﬁne myself to just mentioning these
issues. They deserve more attention than a halfhearted attempt in a footnote could give them.
28. I am presupposing a Fregean notion of propositions here. But even if we assume a
Russelian view, in which propositions are composed of objects and properties, a subject
will still have to subsume these objects and properties under concepts to entertain the
proposition. So, in both views, expressibility depends on the availability of concepts.
29. Earlier versions of this article have been presented at the GAP.9 conference in
Osnabrück and at the Catholic Academy in Berlin. I am grateful to all my commenta-
tors on both events, especially Silvia Jonas, Ben Murphy, Thomas M. Schmidt, and
Christian Tapp.
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